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This paper analyzes in perspective the integration process through which Latin 
America, specially the South Cone, went through during the long formation process of 
the world economy, since the expansion that brought Latin America to capitalist 
development until the early XXI century. It emphasizes the 1980’s, when a new form of 
integration begun, marked by trade and financial liberalization and an increasing 
market integration combined by the formation of trading blocks both in at world and 
regional levels. It studies deeper the special logics and the relations of South Cone as 
destiny of Spanish and Portuguese foreign direct investment. The article is structured in 
two parts: the first one analysis the Latin American integration process with the world 
economy since its origins, markedly the colonial period. The second part studies some 
results and disjunctives of this new period, characterized by the increasing presence of 




Este  paper analisa em perspectiva o processo de integração que América Latina 
especialmente o cone sul, foi realizando durante o processo longo da formação da 
economia-mundo, desde a expansão que trouxe América Latina ao desenvolvimento 
capitalista até o século XXI. Enfatiza os anos 80, quando uma nova onda de integração 
recomeçou, marcado pela liberalização de comércio e das finanças e por uma 
integração crescente dos mercado  no mundo e a níveis regionais. Estuda mais 
profundamente lógicas especiais e as relações do cone sul como o destino do 
investimento directo estrangeiro espanhol e português. O artigo é estruturado em duas 
partes: primeiro uma análise do processo da integração de América Latina com a 
economia de mundo desde a suas origens, marcada pelo período colonial. A segunda 
parte estuda alguns resultados deste período novo, caracterizados pela presença 
crescente de companhias multinacionais e de grandes empresas Ibéricas em América 
Latina.  
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This paper analyzes in perspective the integration process through which Latin 
America, specially the South Cone,1 went through during the long formation process of 
the world economy, since the expansion that brought Latin America to capitalist 
development until the early XXI century. It emphasizes the 1980’s, when a new form of 
integration begun, marked by trade and financial liberalization and an increasing 
market integration combined by the formation of trading blocks both in at world and 
regional levels. It studies deeper the special logics and the relations of South Cone as 
destiny of Spanish and Portuguese foreign direct investment. Under this aspect, the 
South Cone is seen more under an Iberian than under a European or exclusively an 
American view. The Iberians have therefore stepped aside the traditional logic by 
moving forward into a peripheral area outside the circuits of the Tried (USA, Japan and 
EU), oppositely from the other Europeans. This made possible an integration pattern, 
which is what results from companies and economy internalization in the global space.  
Besides this introduction, the article is structured in two parts: the first one analysis the 
Latin American integration process with the world economy since its origins, markedly 
the colonial period. This was followed by independence movements, during which local 
elites controlled export activities and the direct relation with the hegemonic capitalistic 
centers. In the XX century, this export activity created a domestic market and financed 
capital goods imports, making possible some cases of industrial capital formation. This 
capital accumulation transmutation, combined with the 1929 crises effects and the anti-
imperialist disputes, provided a larger autonomy configuration, which was concretized 
in the import substitution model, exhausted in the 1970’s. In the late 1980’s, a new 
period of this integration process took place, this time based on “market solutions”; 
trade and financial liberalization and the transition of social ownership to national and 
foreign capital. These directives are registered in the so called Washington Consensus.  
The second part studies some results and disjunctives of this new period, characterized 
by the increasing presence of large multinational and Iberian companies in Latin 
America. Through the privatization process, they assumed control of the most 
important economic assets, integrating the Latin American companies under an 
accumulation logic based specially on the region’s center. The singularity of South 
Cone compared with the whole Latin America is then distinguished. South Cone is 
predominating related through trade and investments with European Union, mainly 
with Spain and Portugal, the latter when foreign direct investments in Brazil are 
concerned. We analyses the logic of those Iberian investments, its volume and its 
composition, besides its meaning on the integration between the Latin America 
economies in the globalization dynamics. Finally, we consider its late presence and its 
importance as an accelerating element on the integration process based on the market 
logic, despite the fragility of the Portuguese economy, which is peripheral in the 
European Union but is capable of participating in the economical and geostrategic 
globalization of the services industries. 
1. The integration of Latin America in the capitalist world economy and its recent 
transformations 
                                                 
1 TN: The Southern Cone is composed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Latin American economies integration history process stated with the expansion of the 
capitalist European economies in the XVI century onwards. Trade relations made 
possible the creation of production mechanisms and the reproduction of political and 
social forms of capitalist economic organization. This enables a fast cultural 
penetration, which conduced the South Cone countries into a production and cultural 
modernization in its western cense: formation of markets, free factors flows, 
appearance of entrepreneur class, diffusion of capitalist technology and organization, 
urbanization and the formation of the elite’s tastes, preferences and habits. The export-
related elite, symbiosis of Iberians nobleman and white Latin Americans, accorded 
special treatment abroad trough trade with its metropolis – Portugal and Spain. This 
retarded the modernization process or limited it into the productive industries related to 
foreign consumption (raw material destined to the European elites industry or 
consumption, such as coffee, cocoa and sugar). 
The political independence, consequences of the independence wars, did not 
significantly change this mechanism, although some very slow changes were registered. 
The independence actually enlarged this mechanism by market diversification, even 
though the liberal ideology of the independence leaders influenced most of the 
establishment thought. Once in government, this establishment slowly settled a new 
resources allocation that reinforced the capitalist organization, reproducing the 
European usage and habits, and then enabling a second interaction movement with 
European and North American post-Industrial Revolution capitalism. 
The second European capitalist expansion, basically British but also North American, 
enables the integration of Latin America economy with its global scale expansion 
through great companies - mainly in oil, copper, iron, cattle, grains – which created 
trade posts or bought factories. In order to accomplish it, logistic and communication 
infrastructure was financed and extended, state services such as the army were 
modernized and government debt was financed. As a result, this foreign capital built a 
strong influence in national politics, supporting some political and business groups. 
This political control and the clash between European and North American companies 
are related, in some periods, to the warfare between Latin American countries, such as 
the Pacific war and the Chaco war. This process is interrupted by the 1929-32 
depression and the Second World War, which enabled Latin American countries to 
establish import substitution. A previous exam of the continent’s economic problems 
suggests that its economic history in the post-war period is characterized by recurrent 
episodes of vulnerabilities in front of economic shocks. The decrease in terms of trade 
of primary products just after the Great Depression was the basis for import substitution 
policies in the period between late 1940’s and the 1970’s. Latin American governments 
established then a development process in which national industrialization and market 
were very important, even though a strong link with capitalist centers was held through 
the import of capital goods and financial activities with the intention if catching in the 
developed countries. The import substitution model, present in most Latin America 
since 1930’s, was exhausted in the 1970’s. In the 1980, Latin America became net 
capital exporter, because of foreign debt accumulation. As a consequence of this 
foreign exchange crisis, the continent’s economy was forced into stagnation. The 
reproduction of prior growth conditions became impossible and Latin American 
standard of development could not be maintained.  This process caused divergent authoritarian and nationalistic movements in the political 
sector, which were related to the militaries and to the Church, and increased the power 
of landowners and the bourgeoisie. In spite of that, social classes were incorporated to 
consumption by populist and populist-democratic governments, which were based on 
new Christian and socialist political parties, on European ideas that combined with 
populist ideas demanding welfare and consumption, and on the long period expansion 
of the capitalist center. 
The exhaustion of the so called import substitution process, a capitalist development 
patter based on its own forces, was worsened by the oil prices rise of the 1973-74 crisis. 
From then on, Latin American countries were forced to finance its development in 
credit markets created with the resources that flowed out of the 1973-74 oil prices 
increasing, that decreased the international credit owners interest rated to level lower 
than the offered by institutions such as World Bank, IMF and IBD. Consequently, a 
large debt rising process went on without any defined criterion of expansion in the 
second half of 1970’s, increasing the privet debt component. The abundance of 
“pretrodollars” in the 1970’s international system, the petroleum crisis and the 
following international recession caused the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980’s. 
The conditions of the “lost decade” were worsened in many countries by bad economic 
policymaking designed to created recessions and trade surplus. The political facts of 
late 1980’s, specially the end of the soviet block, the effective way of paying Latin 
America’s external debt services to the debt owners, the international thought favorable 
to a marked based development, and the necessity of macroeconomic adjustments to 
stabilize inflation, fiscal expenditure, exchange and interest rates were condensed in the 
so called Washington Consensus. Besides being a way of guaranteeing the stable 
fulfillment of Latin America’s financial obligations, the Washington Consensus were 
designed in order to engage the region into a new development pattern, in which the 
privet sector ought to become more important and structural changes were suppose to 
take place. In spite of the fact that a decade had passed since the beginning of market-
based reforms in Latin America, the 1990’s crisis shows that the region’s external 
vulnerability is still present.2 
The magnitude of the 1980’s crises may have also contributed to the dramatic change in 
the attention focus; the terrible economic and social conditions in the region had 
widened the political space for Latin-American governors, making radical changes 
politically possible. Policymakers started to realize that the state-based development 
model used in the previous decades had been exhausted. Chilean sounding success in 
the previous decade, the final crisis of State-based economies in East Europe and in the 
Soviet Union and finally the speedy growth of East Asian economies made the Latin 
American governments to adopt market-based reforms, such as: financial and trade 
liberalization, strict fiscal discipline and the privatization of state-owned companies. 
The modern development and the economic growth process Latin America was 
implementing started in late 1980’s and were reinforced from then on. Based on the 
thought of North American development specialists, in early 1990’s, after the fall of 
Berlin Wall, a list of economic policy rules became a unique “pattern” of the 
triumphant capitalist economy. A new consensus on economic policymaking was 
                                                 
2 External shocks in vulnerable economies: a Prebisch reconsideration. Nancy Birdsall, Vice-president Executive, Interamerican Bank of 
Development, Carlos Lozada, Latin America Research Group, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. formed. It was a menu-list designed specially to orientate governments in developing 
countries and international organizations (MIF and World Bank) about the importance 
of the new orthodox economic thought for the former, which ask help to the latter. MIF 
and World Bank financial policies forced market and trade liberalization and 
deregulation in order to guarantee absolute freedom to foreign investments and to 
increase the production in export-oriented industries.3 The necessity of state-owned 
companies privatization and of open concurrence to broadly incentive the privet 
initiative was then proclaimed. These rules of the “sane economic administration” were 
perfectly codified by the international financial community, including the MIF, large 
privet international banks and business groups. It all consisted in decreasing the money 
multiplier index, gradually elimination of fiscal deficit, creation of a price system to 
deregulate the public sector activities, and a sustainable market liberalization to achieve 
free trade. In front of such an explicit codification of what was supposed to be sane 
policies, international reliability restoration required ultimately this policymaking 
implementation wherever economic policies differ from the economic orthodox 
thought.4 
The paper includes ten topics on economic policies, among which, according with the 
author, “Washington” agrees. “Washington” means the political-economic-intellectual 
complex composed by the international Organizations (IMF and World Bank), the 
United States Congress, the Federal Reserve, the seniors of United States government 
administration and groups of experts. The topics under agreement were: budget 
discipline; changes in public expenditure priorities (from less productive industries to 
public health, education and infrastructure); fiscal reform in order to enlarge tax basis; 
financial liberalization, specially in the interests; search and maintenance of 
competitive exchanges; trade liberalization; openness to foreign direct investments; 
privatizations; deregulation; and guarantees of property rights.  
From the point of view of the developed countries, specially the United States, this 
consensus formulation meant also a challenge: the fulfillers of measures to help 
developed countries in taking advantages of opportunities and in preventing problems 
in new market emergencies. To many people, the Washington Consensus seamed to 
mark a decisive period on world economic issues. On the moment that the dead-hand of 
state were been withdrew of Third World economies, the investors started to realize the 
great opportunities and benefit of these economies, the world became prepared to a 
large period of fast economic growth in countries that until then were poor, and to 
massive capital movements from North to South. 
This new historical process of the modern world formation in Latin America can be 
analyzed through three points of view: i) the cumulative effort intensification with the 
earning of some collectivities in the center capitalist countries that reflects on the 
financial activity; ii) the widening of technological possibilities horizons opened by the 
microelectronics and iii) the increase of the population share with access to new 
consumption patterns and to esthetical influence originated by tastes and preferences 
                                                 
3 Morador, Mariana Wettstein. El Proceso de Globalizacion Mundial. 
4 The [developing country’s] policies must conform to certain rules. These rules of "sound economic management" are perfectly codified 
by the international financial community, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), large private international banks, and 
business groups. They consist of reducing the rate of expansion in money supply, eliminating the fiscal deficit, devaluing domestic 
currency, deregulating prices and private sector activities, and opening up the economy to free trade. Given such an explicit codification 
of what constitutes sound policies, the restoration of confidence requires strictly abiding by them. In doing so, the economic policies 
acquire distinct orthodox flavor (Foxley, 1983, p.31). diffusion, a process in which different forms of production and market segment are 
deepen. 
Those tendencies are not three distinct phases but three interacted aspects in only one 
historical process. Without the technical innovations of that period, the revenue 
increase would clearly be limited. Besides that, the public purchase power enlargement 
is an essential element to the system reproduction, even though governments do not 
always regard this aspect, which is a flagrant of the repealing through which the 
keynesianism or intervention forms on the aggregate demand have been exposed. In the 
late XX century, there was a generalization of the thesis that market globalization 
process would be imposed worldwide, no matter what policies countries adopt. It was 
as if the world were in front of a technological imperative similar to the one responsible 
to the industrialization process that modeled modern society in the last centuries. 
However, market transposition and destruction carried on by current governments have 
been provoked great structural changes, whose effects are income concentration and 
great social exclusion. With the slider exception of Brazil, government’s universalistic 
policies do not top these growing problems, which are been thought by some as the new 
form of growth whose characters are still not defined.5  
In a Latin American historical perspective, during the 1970´s a new model of economic 
policy was implemented pioneerly in Chile and later in the rest of South Cone. It was 
on the second half of the 1980´s that a different development view was propagated to 
all Continent in the context of external debt negotiation. The negotiation was only one 
for all debt holders countries: the change to a better debt payment condition, which 
included deregulated markets, open economies, non-interventionist governments, and 
the radical deviation from every kind of autonomous and national development project. 
It seamed like a simple circumstantial change of a growth policy for an orthodox 
stabilization policy. 
Lately it was realized that the stabilization policy were transformed from the old 
globalize utopia of liberal pattern into a new model o development offered to the 
peripheral countries in the world system. After that point, in the same way it was 
known in the XIXth century, the development promise and the hope for change in the 
power and money international hierarchy became depended on the acceptance of free 
trade rules and orthodox policies proposed or imposed by hegemonic powers, as in the 
old Victorian times.  
In 1996, Tony Blair adviser on international affairs Richard Cooper published a small 
book entitled The Pos-Modern State and World Order, in which the strategic guidelines 
of this new Anglo-Saxon project to the world periphery were clearly defined. The 
author states the existence of a direct and necessary relation between the financial 
globalization process, the liberal economic policies of the previous decade and the 
project of a new kind of domination acceptable when human rights and cosmopolite 
values are regarded. Accordingly o Cooper, the hegemonic powers do not seek conflict 
among them, but are compiled to export stability and freedom to the other countries.  
Three current world domination structures would come out of these hierarchic 
articulations. It would be a cooperative domination system, capable of regulating the 
relations between the Anglo Saxon world and the other developed countries. Its basis 
would be the decoordination, which is typical of the relation between honest countries 
                                                 
5 Furtado, Celso. “El nuevo capitalismo.” and failure and pre-modern countries, incapable of protecting themselves in its own 
national spaces and dominion. It is also typical of voluntary domination in the world 
economy, directed by financial institutions such as the IMF.6 Designed for countries 
that admit the new aid theology, this domination emphasizes the governing capacity, 
aid and assistance to the countries that open themselves and passively accept the 
intervention carried on by international organization and foreign countries. In synthesis, 
it is an intra-domination project between world powers and the laissez-faire to every 
pre-modern countries in a free-market domination. 
From the 1980’s on, the world economy has been going through a transformation 
process characterized by financial deregulation and privatization of its main industries. 
Since then, globalization deepening can be seen in its trade, financial and productive 
dimensions. This process is mixed with the expansion of multinational and 
transnational companies, which acquired a concentrated financial importance, and 
therefore increases international liquidity and short term profits demand (Scherer, 
1998). It should be regarded that in the studied case, the Iberian case, there is a certain 
“asymmetry” between trade and the ongoing investments, which assume independent 
trajectories.  
The appearance of both emergent markets and a consensus on domestic market 
liberalization is articulated with an adaptation search for the neoliberal development 
pattern. This enables additional financial resources to the growth of new domestic 
market opened to foreign investments, in a new international insertion. The 1950’s and 
1960’s capital flows toward developing countries were related to the financing of 
international trade. Those financial transactions financed real operations, which created 
official capital flows from both multilateral organizations and bilateral institutions that 
compensated shocks on terms of trade. Until late 1960’s and early 1970’s, with the 
appearance of eurodollars, the international privet debt movement were directed toward 
Latin America. The foreign debt problem and the search for alternatives to it – specially 
the Brady Plan – originated debt and capital markets in the region.7 
The reasons of this liberalization are founded in the fact that most of the countries that 
went through a strong recession in the 1980’s and, in the following decade, applied 
macroeconomic stabilization policies searched in market economy a favorable approach 
over foreign investments. Through market-based solutions, in 1990’s the Latin 
American countries adapted themselves to the new financial schemes resulted from the 
changes in the international world economic order. In order to understand the 
vicissitudes of Portuguese and Spanish investments in Latin America, this paper 
considers that macroeconomic picture, a new development scenario and economic 
growth perspective to the continent. 
Bush era did not break or abandoned the project on a new domination acceptable to the 
human right issue. By contrast, when England and United States attacked Afghanistan 
and Iraq, they demonstrated themselves apt to apply the “law of jungle” to the pre-
modern states. In several international or multilateral levels, these countries have 
insistently defended free trade, deregulation and opening of domestic economy in 
developing countries. The necessity that its governments accept international rule has 
been emphasized. Deals carried on with IMF and others international institutions have 
                                                 
6 COOPER, R. (1996), The Post-Modern State And The World Order. Demos, London: World Bank. 
7 Graciela Moguillansky (2002). Inversión y volatilidad financiera: América Latina en los inicios del nuevo milenio. CEPAL – SERIE 
Informes y estudios especiales No 3 División de Desarrollo Económico informes y estudios especiales been designed this way when trade and foreign investments were regarded. This has 
been seen in WTO’s Doha round, and most recently in September 2003 Cancun 
Conference. 
On the other hand, in the global economic voluntary domination world, economic 
figures and data show without doubt that a catch-up process has not been taken place. 
Economic growth rate has been too low and income distribution has been getting worst 
in those countries that accepted and adopted the new aid ideology. Besides that, 
financial crises took place in Argentina, Mexico, East Asia, Russia and Brazil. In this 
early XXst century beginning, few still beliefs in the virtues of the policies advised by 
the “financial organism world consortium”, led by MIF.8 
In the complex of measures that characterize the transition toward this new 
development model, the industry and services privatization policy stands out. Its goals 
are the economic modernization on the basis of modern capitalism and the achievement 
of a deep development of the productive basis, for which the opening to foreign capital 
is considered essentially important. Latin America begins to face a third integration 
phase, which results from national bourgeoisie’s desire to be incorporated in the 
worldwide capitalist expansion process, to participate competitively in industries and 
process that assure them as a minor associate. However, a national bourgeoisie’s 
project can be miscarried at any point, and the issue on National States is not regarded 
as in some European countries, although the economic independence is an almost 
answered question. That is demonstrated by the Mexican case and trade agreements 
between Chile and United States and Europe. Brazil is an exception, for it tries to hold 
the idea about an own industrialization way, even though sectors of Brazilian 
bourgeoisie would happily accept the AFTA. 
Market-oriented economy installation in Latin America has been gradually destroying 
all economical activities not only on products but also on services, such as healthcare, 
education, welfare, infrastructure and communication. A substantive part of social 
ownership has been transferred to domestic and foreign capital, which has been 
concentrating investments on its hands and reorienting economic activity toward the 
development of conditions capable of transforming these countries into primaries goods 
exporters and higher technology level industrial producers. 
A deindustrializing policy led by the financial capital reoriented investments toward 
industries capable of constructing the basis to the so called non-traditional exports. At 
the same time, the economy was been opened to foreign capital in non-transnational 
goods. New exploitation on traditional resources were handled as concession or sold to 
foreign and national capital. The financial sector went through important alterations: 
banks and national insurance companies privatization; opening to the international 
financial sector; availability of new financial resources proceeding from social security 
system privatization and, above all, international privet finance.  
Households have changed substantially theirs expenditure structure. Part of its available 
income had to be expended with healthcare, education - both of which were privatized - 
and a reasonable share of imported consumption goods – whose prices variable with 
changes on exchange rate and monetary policies. Companies that survived from 
monetary and financial shocks or from anti-hiperinflation economic policies were 
forced to readjust its demand according to world market. Minimum-state policies, that 
                                                 
8 Fiori, José Luis. “O Brasil na mudança mundial: espaços em disputa.” substantially limited government’s social responsibilities, were accomplished under the 
finance orthodox sounding lemma and resulted merely in a subsidiary policy.9 
National revenue distribution, its acquisition forms and public expenditure 
insufficiency heightened inequalities between domestic social sectors. Labor share of 
national revenue decreased quantitatively and qualitatively, weather because of real 
wage decreasing or because of an employment-unemployment movement. These 
factors limited the access of an important population part to traditional public goods, 
such as healthcare and education. Consequently, the traditional middle class, who had 
always supported traditional democratic regimes, went through an impoverishment and 
unbalanced process. 
It is indeed true that this new development model caused a productive modernization 
project, which modernized every economic sector. However, it is always true that Latin 
American economies are more vulnerable to world economy’s fluctuation and 
vicissitudes, such as changes on international demand, financial movements, and 
decision carried out by foreign capital owners installed in domestic traditional, new and 
financial industries. Above all, these economies’ weakness is the deterioration on term 
of trade, trade balance and services balance. These cannot be avoided because of 
commodities over-supply in the world market and because of narrow efficiency margin, 
which force active exchange rate policy and especially foreign debt increasing.  
The other economic integration side was the opening of Latin American economies to 
foreign companies and foreign financial capital. This has open space for a vigorous 
Iberian companies presence in the continent, especially if one regards service 
industries: banking, insurance, telecommunications and domestic services. There 
seemed to be a caravel returning after almost two centuries of absence. In order to 
analyze this Spanish and Portuguese presence, on must study geographic localization 
factors, quantify figures and identify agents. To understand in what extent this foreign 
investments wave modernizes Latin American economies one must establish evaluation 
criterions. There is no possibility of national development in the patterns of the 
capitalist world economy; it simply cannot be possible for every country. As a world 
system, capitalism is naturally polarized. The center, the periphery and the distinct 
social formations that share the world system are not simply unequal developed 
formations, but interdependent formations in this inequality. Capital accumulation 
process requires a hierarchic system in which the surplus is unequally divided when 
both space and social classes are regarded. Historically, capitalist development has 
generated and required a growing socioeconomic, geographic and demographic 
polarization. 
After the lost decade, during the 1990’s a new economic growth process took place, 
along with trade and financial liberalization. Companies that survived increased theirs 
competitiveness, specialized their activities, used their comparative advantages and 
begun an internationalization process in regional and world level.  
This process has generally led the Continent toward a low aggregated value 
specialization pattern, which pushes its economies into an increasing search for 
                                                 
9 1930’s polemic between Treasury members and non- Treasury members, among them Keynes, can be seen in CWJMK, Vol. XIX e XX, 
Macmillan, 1971. Subsidiary principle is Public Choice answer to keynesian fiscal policies. This can be seen, for example, in , G.C. 
Peden(1988), " Keynes, TheTreasury and Brithish Economic Policy", The Economic History Society. -(1983), "Sir Richard Hopkins and 
the Keynesian Revolution in Employment Policy, 1929-1945, Economic History Review, 36(2), pp. 281-296. -(1980), “Keynes, The 
Treasury and the Unemployment in the Later Nineteenthierties, in John Cunningham Wood(ed.), " John Maynard Keynes: Critical 
Assessments", Croom Helm, London & Camberra, 1983, Vol.I, pp. 564-580. investments and exports financing, in order to guarantee external counts balance and to 
accomplish industry restructure. Besides that, imports increased, which allows one to 
conclude that world economy integration is processed through companies that trade, 
invest or participate in investments and that consume imported goods at a unique level.  
The way toward modernity requires not only durable and capital goods imports, but 
also consumption goods and services imports likewise in Europe and United States. If 
the last centuries expansion process integrated a small share of population, this new 
process goes beyond social instability, unemployment and labor market precariousness. 
This time, larger middle class sector integrate in world economy, whether by the larger 
companies services in Latin America, or by consumption levels equal to the ones in 
Europe and the United States. In either way, this leads to a different social 
segmentation, marked by the appearance of poor areas, new riches and old political 
actors in new positions – like the army and the Church. A relative balance between 
winners and losers is, thus, required.  
2. South Cone: Iberian investments and its dynamics in the new international order 
2.1 The Iberian logic and some disjunctives  
One must take into consideration different dynamics that interacts simultaneous when 
integration and capital internationalization process are regarded. Under this perspective, 
there are a couple of integrations. The first one responds for the center to the periphery. 
It is lead by transnational companies and can be characterized by intra-industry 
integration toward the world and/or the domestic markets. The second one is originated 
in the periphery’s search for integration. It can be regarded if one takes into account 
productive chains where related companies, whether domestic or foreign, act 
articulately. The former is the case of foodstuff, automobile, textile and other 
industries.  
An evaluation of Iberian companies investment process under an institutional logic 
suggests that a new kind of integration is under action since the 1990’s. This article is 
interested in bringing into evidence those aspects that present economic integration 
modernization in the globalization process in Latin America. We are convinced that a 
new phase of this integration is on process, and that it requires a larger interaction, such 
as the panamerican project of AFTA and the autonomous and not well formulated 
Brazil-Argentina industrial project. The latter aims the participation of both countries in 
the capitalist expansion in order to increase their population welfare and narrow the gap 
between developed and developing world. In this cense, the Iberian companies replace 
economically part of the state’s role, and therefore acquire a large political importance 
in the society by integrating itself with the state through legal contracts regulation 
terms, specific services obligations and industry regulation necessary to guarantee tariff 
regimes that enable access to the whole population to such services and welfare.  
Foreign direct investment flows have traditionally been associated with a number o 
benefits to developing countries. It is stated that those investments enable the inflow of 
new technologies capable o increasing the receiving country’s efficiency level. Many 
authors have defended the existence of externalities, which causes positive affects not 
only to the receiving investment company but also to the other domestic companies, in 
a systemic process. Some researches bring evidences that partially support these 
hypotheses. 
The most recent empirical research on the relation between economic policy and 
growth rates was based on a 1991 paper of Barro and Barro’s specifications (a empirical model based on the standard neoclassic theories on growth). According to 
this model, growth rate differences between countries are caused by differences on real 
income per capita and the income level per capita. Most researches contain an 
investment of revenue index, which is a sort of human capital and population growth 
measures. 
Besides these three variables, one can think about three classes of variable that can 
affect income level in different countries: structural differences between countries; 
exogenous factors such as export markets changes responding to time but not to 
countries and theirs policy variables. In most research on the subject, this latter variable 
system is used to estimate impacts in policies growth or changes in policies, 
macroeconomic reforms and structural reforms. 
Loayza and Montiel (ELM, 1997) is a good representative example of latter research 
that tries to measure econometrically the impacts of reforms and other variables. They 
used a world chart of 70 countries, to each one a 5-observation chart was created based 
on the 1961-1993 term. Several parameters were added to the regressions in order to 
measure the impacts of structural reforms in Latin America growth and to determine the 
latter reform effects in the continent economy. Some of the parameters are: legal and 
illegal market changes; money as GDP quotient, in order to regard financial 
liberalization; inflation and government consumption; and investment coefficient on 
GDP, in order to regard not directly measured reform effects. 
In these researches, reforms mean basically macroeconomic policy reforms, which are 
different from the so called structural reforms, such as trade and capital liberalization or 
privatization. This distinction is stated by Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1997). 
According to this research, the macroeconomic policies of the latter years have 
aggregated 1,3% to the average growth rates and the structural reforms have aggregated 
an additional half of this figure. They conclude that Latin America have not gone 
through a more intense growth process because reforms have been implemented in an 
international scenario which were relatively not favorable. As a final conclusion, they 
state that in order to achieve higher growth rates in the long term, the region must not 
only intensify but also widen structural reforms in process.  
Lora and Barrera (1998) used an index system on reforms developed by Lora (1997) to 
estimate the structural reform’s effects on the region growth. They came out with a 
standard growth model with a 19 countries crossed chart combined with the 
observations of a PROMEDIO on the period starting in 1987. The results show that 
1,3% of the growth rates are caused by structural reforms.  
Sala and Martin (1997a, 1997b) propose a less rigorous alternative that runs on a 
structure base composed by the 63 possible variables that have been used in the 
literature. After running three variables that appear in most research (initial revenue and 
two human capital measures), it combines the variable with every possible combination 
of the other variables arranged in groups of three. It then calculates the density 
cummulated function (DCF) to every variable. Each one of the regression results 
appears separately. A variable is significant if its DCF is greater that 0,95. According to 
this criteria, the most significant variables are investment in capital goods, years during 
which the economy has been opened, distance from the equator, higher exports, and 
several political and sociological variables. One must note that none measure on 
government expenditure, inflation, financial restriction alternatives or tariff 
sophistication have been regarded as most significant. As an operational difficulty with this procedure, Sala and Martin have considered separately around two thousand to four 
thousand regressions to determinate the regressors of the 63 variables.  
Ley and Steel (1999) investigated the application of incertitude in a cross-country 
regression model as a bayesian approximation with not most evident results. At last, on 
a Cepal paper, Escaith and Morley (2000) measure the impact of trade, capital account, 
financial reforms and privatization in growth. The results surprisingly imply the 
conclusion that impacts of these different reforms cancel each other. Even though 
human capital formation and education level increased, the results clearly confirm the 
importance of macroeconomic stability.  
Foreign companies present much greater productivity levels than domestic companies, 
and foreign direct investment effectively contribute to higher productive level 
achievement by companies. It has actually a positive effect over productive growth rate. 
However, its quantitative impact seems to be small. The results confirm the potential of 
externalities on the productivity level, but there seems to be no significant effect over 
productivity growth rate.10 
This phenomenon raises questions about foreign capital impact over the economy, 
especially because the literature suggests the existence of several benefits to countries 
that receive foreign direct investments. The greatest part of foreign direct investment 
flows can contribute to increase economic growth in developing countries through three 
mechanism: (i) capital stock increase, and consequently the increase of the economy’s 
productive capacity; (ii) greater foreign exchange inflow that helps to lighten foreign 
unbalances and, therefore, attenuate its harmful effects over growth; and (iii) 
transferences of new production, marketing and administration techniques, which 
contribute to the economy’s overall productivity (Romer: 1993). 
There is empirical evidence of this when the aggregated level is regarded. Borensztein, 
De Gregorio and Lee (1998) studied the effect of foreign direct investment from 
industrialized countries in 69 developing countries. It came out that these investments 
affect positively the receiving countries’ economies. Besides that, they conclude that 
these positive effects can only be internalized if those economies have a minimum 
human capital stock.  
Several researches with companies’ figures have approached this topic, some of which 
found out appositive relation between foreign direct investment and productivity on the 
companies level. Caves (1974) and Globerman (1979) have shown that in Australia and 
Canada domestic companies are more efficient in those industries where multinational 
companies are present. Blomström (1986), by its turn, studied Mexican factoring 
companies performance between 1970 and 1975. He concluded that foreign capital 
presence affects positively companies’ efficiency levels. In the Mexican case, Bloström 
and Wolff (1994) found out that foreign direct investment has a positive and significant 
effect on productivity growth rate. It is then asserted that foreign direct investment can 
generate externalities to all domestic companies. According to it, a greater foreign 
capital participation in the economy can not only improve the receiving company’s 
performance, but also the other companies’ performance too, since those can be favored 
by knowledge and technology spillover contained in these capital flows. 
                                                 
10 Roberto Alvarez, INVERSION EXTRANJERA DIRECTA EN CHILE Y SU IMPACTO SOBRE LA PRODUCTIVIDAD, 
Department of Economy, University of Chile. In relation to the existence externalities or knowledge spillovers, evidences about the 
benefits of foreign direct investment to domestic companies are not conclusive. On this 
issue, Haddad and Harrison (1993) have studied spillovers in Moroccan factoring 
companies between 1985 and 1989. They conclude that there are no evidences of 
spillovers in those cases. Aitken and Harrison (1999) use panel data on Venezuelan 
factories between 1976 and 1989 to conclude that foreign investment effect on the 
company’s productive is positive, although it decreases domestic companies’ 
productivity. At last, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) found out that join ventures and 
foreign capital participation generate a negative effect on productivity of companies 
with no foreign owners. In the case of Chile and other Latin American countries, one 
can note that these economies received heavy foreign capital inflow 1990’s and, besides 
that, registered growth rate higher than their historical average.  
Many research partially support the hypothesis on productivity and externality effects. 
Foreign companies present much greater productivity levels than domestic companies, 
and the participation on foreign direct investment helps the latter companies to improve 
it. However, its quantitative impact appears to be small. The results confirm the 
existence of potentialities and externalities in the other companies, but there seems to 
be no significant effect on growth rate.  
This paper can then disregard that foreign direct investment inflows are associated with 
dramatic changes on productivity growth in Latin America economy, especially when 
in South Cone economies. 
The expansion period that follows early 1980’s crisis intensified corporative 
international concurrence and brought about significant aspect of competitively 
globalization, whose effects can be regarded through the dimension achieved by fusion 
and acquisition process, specially in United States, Europe and Japan. Technology 
changes caused by the development and fast diffusion of microelectronic, together with 
its applications in computing and telecommunications, not only impelled productive 
transformations but also expedited financial globalization by making the transmission 
of great amounts of information cheap and instantaneous. The improvement of greater 
international information disposition about the supply of goods and services favored the 
globalization of demand, which, by its turn, promoted both global expansion of supply 
and concurrence intensification. It does not only refer to the appearance of new 
economic spaces, in which companies compete based on scale to create and increase its 
market share through tradition elements (prices, quality, distribution, assistance etc). A 
profound change in both the productive system and the competitiveness determinants 
takes place. This is pushed by to forces: technology changes and innovations on 
production organization, which implies new product and process technologies and new 
forms of management. The characteristic of both inter-companies and intra-company 
relations are changed, for the system’s concurrence privileges as main characteristics 
flexibility, quality and cooperation. This is part of a process that establishes a strong 
link between flexible technologies application in factoring production and forms of 
organizing the productive process. 
Competitiveness globalization put into movement fusion an acquisition processes and 
liberalization of new enclosures of industrialized countries’ economies. The latter 
happened especially in some services segments that went on privatization process and 
enabled foreign direct investment expansion in these industries, manly in financial 
industries. With the greater international coordination of macroeconomic policies from the 1980’s on, the decreasing of oil prices and improvement on growth expectation, 
multinational companies adopted a strong international concurrence strategy, whose 
goal was to wider and to consolidate their participation in most attractive markets. This 
strategy increased market concentration in foreign direct investment’s both outflow and 
inflow economies, respectively the industrialized and the developing countries. Latin 
America is highlighted in this process as the third greatest investment-receiving region, 
above the triode countries – Europe, United States and Japan – and very close to Asian 
countries.  
The Iberian companies brought to Latin America a specific group of attributes, different 
from those that had characterized foreign investment. North-American, European and 
Japanese companies have traditionally integrated industries, according to an intra-
company logic and/or to a foreign consumer vinculum logic. Effects on productivity are 
either restricted to industries where those companies operate or scarce. They do not 
contribute to competitiveness increasing and are located in differentiated enclaves. 
Theses effects does not require much qualified labor and do not stimulate research nor 
development projects, except in cases in which there is an emphasis on domestic 
market, as in the automotive industry. Multinational companies attract less qualified 
labor, nevertheless generally pay higher wage, and then create higher demand, usages, 
habits and custom related to the center.11 Given the high capital concentration and its 
monopoly power, multinational companies have generally imposed its interests before 
states and power in the receiving countries. 
The new foreign investment wave, moved on by Iberian companies, has different 
characteristics relatively to those before it. Both were capable of modernizing less 
productivity industries, such as services. By doing so, they could improve productive 
services in general, including non-integrated industries, such as building, healthcare, 
financial services, insurance, tourism etc.  
In the 1990’s, especially after 1995, Portuguese companies’ investment in Brazil 
achieve an important dimension. After 1996, Brazil overtook Spain as the main destiny 
of Portuguese foreign direct investment. Since then, Portugal stands at a higher position 
as foreign direct investor in Brazil. 
We assert that the tendency of these Portuguese foreign direct investments is part of an 
Iberian logic, which begun in the 1980’s, with a Spanish strategy in Latin America, 
specially in the South Cone – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
According to this perspective, we synthesize the singular aspect to this Iberian logic in 
three predominant aspects, which are be exposed in this paper. 
The first characteristic is that, differently from the Triad countries, Portugal and Spain 
address most of their investments to countries that are not part of the Triad or, in a 
broader cense, are not part of OCDE. 
The second characteristic is related to investment’s profile. It is located predominantly 
in services directed to domestic market and, therefore, which operate with non-tradable 
goods.12 This is translated through social integration, as global consumers, of some 
population segments in the capitalism world. 
                                                 
11 Once the Chilean case is referred, until the 1960’s, when the “Chilenization” of cooper begun, supervisors were generally from United 
States. From then on, they were replaced by Chilean engineers who used to work as subordinators. En el caso chileno hasta los años 
sesenta cuando comienza la chilenización del Cobre, los supervisores eran por lo general de origen norteamericano, siendo substituidos 
posteriormente por ingenieros chilenos que ocupaban posiciones subordinadas 
12 There is actually Portuguese-Spanish cooperation between phone companies and in a electric energy company. This is surely a 
dominant tendency. Finally, the third Iberian investments characteristic is that they are addressed to 
countries that speech Iberian languages and are culturally related to Iberian countries. 
This implies important synergies, such as language, which decrease transaction costs 
and make other positive but no so visible factors possible, such as reliability, friendly 
ship and historic heritage. There is an entire literature on transaction costs minimization 
as a common token and, analogously, communication costs through a common 
language [Ramos Silva, 2000]. 
The demand for foreign investments is an answer of emergent markets to this 
concurrence in the world process. It represents an attractive to trade and foreign 
investments, and is previous intervention object by the leading countries: United States, 
Germany and Japan. In the 1990’s, there was a strong Spanish and Portuguese 
intervention, which was much more Iberian than European if investments are regarded. 
It means that, when internationalization process of Portuguese and Spanish companies 
are considered, one can see that Spanish investment are manly directed to Latin 
America, while Portuguese investments are directed to Brazil. 
Foreign investments have been located in fusion and acquisition process of already 
existing assets, especially in the following industries: financing (banks, insurance 
companies, retiring founds), telecommunication, energy, transportation (production, 
distribution, flying companies) and others such as services, trade, urban residues 
treatment and tourism. Companies from Europe and United States have played the main 
role in this process, which was based on public companies privatization and privet 
companies acquisition in most South Cone countries.  
European, North American and Japanese investments are per se almost the whole 
foreign direct investment in South Cone, and investments in other regions of the world 
or intra-region investments are exiguous. South Cone countries concentrate almost half 
of European and North American investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
more than 80% if only Japanese investments are regarded. If one considers Chile, 
Mexico and the Andes Pact countries, a great deal of the investments are directed 
toward the most developed countries in the region. This is simply because the most 
developed countries are the ones that most rapidly intend to withdraw concurrence and 
labor division advantages in the new strategic international insertion process. Since late 
XIXth century, these countries had gone through a previous capitalism development, 
with a dynamic exporting sector and a forming domestic market, which enabled 
financing of capital goods imports.   
Latin America: Capital Flows 
  1970  1980  1990  1995  1998 1999 2000 
Total (US$ billons)  4.2  29.9  21.8  75.4  142.6  116.5  102.4 
    Official flows  1.0  5.3  9.2  12.6  12.3  5.2  0.4 
    Privet flows  3.3  24.6  12.6  62.8  130.2  111.3  102.0 
     Foreign  direct 
investment 
1.1  6.1  8.2  29.8  72.1 90.4 76.2 
        Investments  in 
portfolios 
0.0  0.0  1.1  7.6  1.7 3.9 9.9 
        Bonds  0.1  0.8  0.1  11.5  18.3  19.1  11.0 
       Commercial 
banks and others 
2.1 17.7  3.2 13.9  38.1  -2.0 5.0 
Total  (percentage)  100  100  100  100  100 100 100 
Official  flows  23.2  17.7  42.1  16.8  8.7 4.5 0.4 
Privet  flows  76.8  82.3  57.9  83.2  91.3 95.5 99.6 
        Foreign  direct 
investment 
25.8  20.5  37.6  39.5  50.5 77.5 74.4 
        Investments  in 
portfolios 
0.0  0.0  5.1  10.1  1.2 3.3 9.6 
        Bonds  1.3  2.7  0.5  15.2  12.8  16.4  10.7 
Commercial banks 
and others 
49.7 59.1 14.8 18.4 26.7  -1.7  4.9 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2001 
 
 
The amount of Spanish investments in Latin America has increased since the 1980’s. It 
has been benefited by the favorable international conjuncture and by the reinsertion 
process of Latin America economies, which were seeking foreign financing to their 
exporting sector, to theirs industry restructuring through privatization and to balance 
their foreign accounts. These were done accordingly to the liberal model of market 
economy installation: decreasing the role government had traditionally had in those 
economies (Zapata: 1999). A significant part of this phenomenon is explained by the 
aggressive role of Spain, with the important contribution of Portugal.  
In a broader cense, foreign direct investment in Latin America assumed four basic 
characteristics in the 1990’s (CEPAL: 2000). First, it rose quickly, from US$ 6.758 
billons in 1990 to US$ 70.275 billions in 1999; second, it concentrated in a few 
countries; third, it was quite flexible in face of international financial crisis, for it 
increased significantly while international flows of other kind decreased; forth, two 
thirds of it consisted in purchasing of already existing assets. 
The slow recuperation after the debt crisis, financial fragility of states and economic 
stagnation gave place to a new conception on development pattern from the 1980’s 
onwards. This was the first element to support the opening of Latin American 
economies to foreign capital through the selling of strategic industries in the domestic 
market. Spanish investments in Latin America went a long way through possibilities 
created by the opening to investments, corresponding to an insertion strategy that had 
been designed since the 1980’s. Spanish investments summed up US$ 1.037 billions in 
1995 and US$ 5.653 billions in 1998 (it summed up US$ 1.969,7 billions in the late 
1980’s, US$ 3.288,5 billions in 1990, and US$ 6.511,7 billions in 1991) (Arahuetes, 
1996,5). 
Spain invested heavily in service industries during the 1990’s, moving forward its 
1980’s investments. The most important industries are transportation, communication, 
urban infrastructure, oil and energy, banking and insurance. Although investments were strongly concentrated in those industries, Spanish capital were also invested in 
agriculture and tourism, that do not represent much of global Spanish investments but 
are very significant to Latin America countries, for it support non traditional exports of 
foodstuff, fishing, tourism etc. 
As a characteristic, those investments are carried on by small number of banks and 
companies, such as Bilbao Bank, Vizcaya, Argentaria, Santander Hispano Bank, 
Endesa, Repsol and Telefónica. Spanish companies lead acquisition processes in all 
Latin America, and large companies control a reasonable share of several industries 
such as communication, energy and financing.  
From the second half of the 1990’s onward, Portuguese investments started an 
important move in the approximation process between Portuguese and global economy 
if international capital formation is regarded. A new period of large investments in 
Brazil took place. Together with Spanish capital in some of Endesa’s and Telefónica’s 
business, Portuguese investments have presented some of the characteristics verified 
with Spanish investments. They are located almost exclusively in Brazilian industries 
of delimited intervention, such as trade, urban infrastructure, financing services and 
telecommunications, which constitute these investments’ core. That is, Portuguese 
capital was invested in services that operate in the domestic market, especially in the 
South Cone. Likewise Spain and differently from European logic on trade, Portugal 
insisted on its natural advantages by choosing Latin America, and particularly Brazil, as 
the main destiny of its investments, as possibilities appeared with privatization process 
in Argentina, Chile and other countries. Most Portuguese investments abroad are in 
communications, financing, and housing industry (see chart).13 Brazil was the number 
one destiny of Portuguese foreign direct investment between 1998 and 2000,14 in a 
tendency that started in late 1990’s with the acquisition of Telesp Celular of São Paulo, 
in 1998. 
The amount of investments increased 20 times in only five years, increasing the pace of 
investments carried on by the large Portuguese companies, some of which were 
privatized in the 1990’s, or privet groups created in the 1980’s market economy, with 
dimension, capacity and financial power to compete in developing markets. The general 
tendency of these investments begun with privatization process and were prolonged 
with modernization and restructuring process in companies.  
Accumulated investments summed up US$ 6 billions already in 2000, which is 
equivalent to 5% of the Portuguese GDP [Bank of Portugal, 2000]. It is true that a 
considerable part of this investment came from Portugal Telecom, which operates in all 
seven Portuguese-spoken countries and acquire CRT and Telesp Celular. Portugal 
Telecom has reach an agreement with Telefónica on Telesp Celular through a joint 
venture created by the two Iberian companies, in an Iberian interchange logic on 
participations, which also includes assets combinations held by Endesa and EDP in 
other countries. The same can be said about the agreement between Telefónica and PT 
in Morocco, in which both companies act together in the acquisition of a cellular phone 
network. The other 25% of the investments are applied in banks (CGD), supermarkets, 
wood pulp and laminate (Grupo Sonae). In 2000, Portuguese investment distribution in 
Brazil gathered a group of companies in the Portuguese market, such as Mello Bank, 
                                                 
13 The representing percentage varies from one year to another exactly because the investment profile. Since it is basically companies’ 
acquisition, the investment pace depends on the privatization process pace. 
14 The figures illustrate well the profile and the logic of Portuguese investments in Braziland, by other side, in Spain. BES Group, CGD, Pestana Group, EDP, Cimpor, Somague, GJM group, Brisa. 
However, one cannot ignore the fact that the larger share of those foreign direct 
investments are owned by PT and Sonae, respectively in the first and second place. 
This investment process contrasts with the weak flow toward Central and East Europe, 
which increased a little. This also contrasts with the weak Portuguese investments flow 
toward Africa, which are low compared with the general investment level, but 
represents a very high share to the PALOP (African countries that officially speak 
Portuguese).  
2.2 Portugal insertion in Europe and in the world economy and the reasons for 
investments in Latin America 
Social and economical asymmetries between Portugal the other EU countries have been 
decreasing since the 1950’s. On the other hand, a greater trade and financial 
performance became possible since 1986, when Portugal and Spain joint the EU. Now a 
days Portugal is in the more ambitious process of been part of a National States 
federation, which includes border abolition and the replacement of national currencies 
for the Euro, EU’s symbolic and economic expression. This is the end of the remaining 
trade barriers and monetary, fiscal and trade independent policymaking, which will be 
replaced by European macroeconomic policymaking. This process’ originality is the 
absence of existing models to be followed. It is the construction of a political 
engineering projected with a supra-national institutional horizon. 
The path to Euro was based on “convergence criterions” expressed in the Maastricht 
Treaty, which defined some very well known exigencies. Each member-state’s 
macroeconomic data and tendencies had to point at a convergence level based on price 
stability and necessary presumptions for a common currency, without risking 
macroeconomic policymaking at the supranational level. Portugal successfully fulfilled 
those convergence criteria. However, this issue must be analyzed under the perspective 
that harmonization costs may increase asymmetries in terms of real or structural 
convergence compared to other UE members. Economic, political and historical issues 
are relevant on this matter, for according to Europe’s internal spatial logic, Portugal, 
much more than Spain, is out of the UE’s core, which is composed by the ark London-
Milan, that is, from Southern England to Northern Italy (Durand, 1992). 
Without disregarding differences narrowing, one must note that economic structure, 
company patter and human resources’ quality put the Portuguese economy in a 
fragility/vulnerability situation and limit its competitiveness and its international 
insertion in face of European pattern. One cannot forget that Portugal did not take part 
of the innovation cycles of the first and second Industrial Revolution. Therefore, 
Portuguese industrial capital formation was retarded. It took place when technologic 
and financial barriers were already established at the international level. Until mid-
XXth century, Portuguese industrial structure was composed by wage-goods with low 
aggregated value, directed mainly to interregional market. Portugal exporting capacity 
was limited to some few primary goods.  
In the second half of the XXth century, Portuguese industrial and service segments 
became more dynamic. Portugal was then incorporated in the post-war expanding 
cycle, which enables the spillovers of technology process, products, management and 
science-technologies. Even though, there was no initiative in innovation at the national 
level, which is the ultimate factor responsible for sustaining the competitiveness in the 
long term. A map on the competitiveness “hard core” of Portuguese industrial exports, which 
correspond to 80% of total in 1996, shows the following composition:15 
Competitiveness based on costs: textile-leather (31%) and wood, furniture, ceramic and 
glass (8%); 
Competitiveness based on natural resources and/or scale economies: cellulose and 
paper, oil refining and non-metallic mineral products (8%); 
There is also the beverage industry (3%), which is a decadent industrial cluster 
associated with natural resources. However, in recent past the electro-electronic cluster 
increased, based on human resources with higher qualification than the average in the 
transforming industry. This new cluster is composed by electric machine (12%) and 
transport equipment (17%). 
Portuguese industry’s specialization presents severe fragilities, which can be detected if 
a conjunct of wide-used criterions are taking into account. These criterions are: current 
and expected evolution of world demand; development of recurring ex-ante to the 
exporting structure; the direction of national competitive production of goods and 
equipments; installed activities vulnerabilities before foreseen deregulation of the 
European and Supranational markets (Lança: 2000,33). 
A compared analysis on EU member’s figures and trends (European Communities, 
1999) shows that, regarding transformation industry in 1988/1998, Portugal is among 
the countries with higher aggregated value increase (together with Austria). Its average 
annual growth reaches 6,7%, which is a lower figure only if compared to Ireland’s 
7,9%. This growth results from the expansion of automobiles and electric devices 
industry. One must point out that Portugal was the only country that presents 
retrogression trends on production specialization and exports of domestic comparative 
advantages. That is, there was a relative retrogression in textile, foodstuff and wooden 
products industries. Spain, on the other hand, is the third on the same ranking and 
corresponds to the eighth position with an annual average growth of 3,6%, which is 
also higher than EU average (2,9%). However, there was no significant change on the 
production specialization or on exports.  
This analysis referred to Portugal is promising, since it responds to a determined 
conversion in industrial structure linked with the participating increase of higher 
aggregate value industries. Nevertheless, most of these inversions are part of 
transnational companies’ strategies and, in this cense, are quite vulnerable, once they do 
not imply concurrence struggle. With insufficient on labor’s qualification and 
technological and concurrence structure, negative externalities can prevail and give 
place to dislocation, which are a not depreciable risk. This is especially true if one 
considers the expansion toward East, whose economies represent a lower direct and 
indirect costs alternative and counts with higher labor qualification (Guedes, 2001). 
Under this perspective, it is important to point out that the whole conjunct of the 
Portuguese industrial companies does not count with strong aspects that could enable 
its competitive international projection. It is for this reason that this possibility is 
limited to the service segments, as verified in the 1990’s. Another limiting aspect is the 
dimension issue: not only the Portuguese market is small to any expansion carried on 
by domestic companies, but also these companies are not strong enough to become 
                                                 
15 To a analysis on Portuguese industry competitiveness, see Lança (2000), who studies Portuguese exports profile. See also a compared 
study on European industry competitiveness (European Communities, 1999). global-players. Consequently, Portuguese companies must formulate selective 
strategies and/or cooperate with other companies in order to maintain their independent 
strategies. For these reasons and for some domestic factor, Brazil appears as an 
alternative to Portuguese investments, likewise Spanish investments in Latin America, 
specially the South Cone, since the 1980’s. The latter aspect refers to the internal logics 
of the American continent and deserves some references. In analysis on Latin America, 
the perspective of the whole is predominant, and for this reason particularities of Latin 
American countries and even subcontinents are seldom regarded. That is the case of the 
South Cone, which is composed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.16 
These economies sum up a GDP close to US$ 1 trillion, which correspond to 60% of 
the Latin American GDP, and have a potential market of 210 million people.17 
At a more abstract level, one can naturally identify a historical and cultural common 
origin and, likewise, several economic and geopolitical conditioning present in Latin 
American countries that enable Iberian investments receiving. However, at a more 
concrete level and along with different national trajectories, disparities are significant 
and do not allow a non-differentiated analysis.18 One can sum up asserting that the 
South Cone and the MERSUR constitute a distinct reality, since the United States are 
not these economies’ main partner. Their trade and financial links are mostly with the 
EU, with which a “Cooperation Inter-regional Agreement” was sign in 1995. The 
implementation of a program on reciprocal trade flows was then considered. One can 
though take into account that Brazil and Chile have significant trade relations with East 
Asia. 
If intra-regional trade relations are concerned, there are greater activities in the South 
Cone than in the rest of the continent. Besides that, during the 1990’s, MERCOSUR’s 
total trade flow increased from US$ 4,1 billions to US$ 20 billions, which correspond 
to a growth rate relatively superior than those verified in the world economy. Trade 
relations between MERCOSUR and abroad also increased, even though at a smaller 
level. Summing up the considerations above, MERCOSUR conditioning with USA 
economy is smaller than the one with the EU and the complementarities between the 
MERCOSUR countries are greater than between any others Latin American countries.  
Taking the American continent into consideration, one can verify that the closer 
countries are to the United States, the greater North American trade and investments 
flow are relatively to the rest of Latin America.19 Mexico, for example, has recently 
replaced Japan as the second larger trade partner with the United States, before Canada. 
Total trade flows between Mexico and the United States reach about 85% of global 
Mexican trade. In a less aggregately cense, Mexican most important trade industries are 
                                                 
16 The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), created in 1991, is not composed by Chile, even though that country is an 
associated member since 1996. Bolivia is in that same position since 1997. As far this paper is concerned, discussions and implications 
about the Southern Cone are also related to Chile and Bolivia. 
17 MERCOSUR’s GDP decreased significantly since 1999 because the depreciation of Brazilian real. Brazilian economy is to more than 
two times larger than the other economies together. For economical and demographic figures on MERCOSUR during the 1990’s, see the 
website of the Statistical and Geography Brazilian Institute (IBGE): http://www.ibge.gov.br. This source is actually called “European 
Community – MERCOSUR Statistical Cooperation Project”, which includes Chile. Two aspects stress our perspective. The first one is 
EU’s effort in disposing to MERCOSUR countries its experience on statistical harmonization, which were carried on by National 
Institutes of Statistics networking in the Eurostat. Second, the inclusion of Chile proves the interest and comprehension of the Southern 
Cone as a privileged part of UE’s economical diplomacy.  
18 To this paper’s goals one must first regard not only the nature of Latin American financial and trade links, such as the Triade, but also 
intra-region relations. 
19 To studies on figures about the composition of trade of goods according to categories and destinies in all Latin America and the 
Caribbean, see Cepal, 2001. To an analysis on differences of competitiveness per country, industries and companies, see Mortimore and 
Perez, 2001. the oil industry and the Exporting Maquiladoras Industries (IMEs). The latter respond 
to the export processing zones, where United States investments are virtually absolute. 
Almost half of Mexican industrial labor works in IMEs. 
Therefore, when relation between UE and Latin America (trade and investments) are 
concerned, one can assert that the South Cone is a preferential partner. This paper 
sustains than, in the 1990’s, European presence in the South Cone assumed a 
determinant Iberian logic. The relation between financial situation of Iberian larger 
investors (Telefónica and Portugal Telecom, for example) and the South Cone 
economies performance shows how much the Iberian economies are linked to the South 
Cone. These companies were affected not only by the Argentinean peso crises in 2001, 
and its effects in local financial markets, but also by the continuing South Cone’s 




This paper briefly analyzed the integration processes Latin America, and especially the 
South Cone, went through. The American continent was incorporated to the European 
trade capital in the earliest stages of globalization, when a single world economical 
system started its development. It is here emphasized the period from the 1980’s 
onward, when a new integration begun, based on simultaneous trade and financial 
liberalization processes and on growing market integration, especially with economic 
blocks formation. It characterized spatial logics in Latin American, whose analysis 
usually regard it as a whole and, therefore, usually disregard its particularities, which 
explain different integration dynamics in different areas in the continent. Differently 
from other regions, the South Cone’s trade and investments links are mainly related to 
the EU, and since the 1990’s the Iberian investments have been predominant. In this 
perspective, this paper analyzed the investments’ selective logic separately, concerning 
more directly the Spanish Portuguese cases, where the former is almost completely 
related to Brazil. The relevant points are the follow:  
1. The Iberian investments’ logic derived from a choice based on the reality of Spanish 
and Portuguese economies and companies. Benefited from linguistic, historical and 
cultural affinities, the Iberian investments find more favorable conditions in the South 
Cone than in any rich country that composes the Triad. The Iberian countries are 
actually the only Triad component that invests more outside the capitalist organic 
nucleon than into it.  
2. Differently from what may appear, the Iberian investments’ rationality is not a Third-
World type nor is opposed to the European economy. It is designed to survive, gaining 
scale in order to exist in the European context. 
3. Differently from the United States and from the richest European countries, the 
Iberian investments did no follow a path open by previous trade and industrial 
subsidiaries. It was not the case of foreign direct investment with exporting strategy. 
These investments were directed almost completely to service industries that operate in 
the domestic market. They were carried on in fusion and acquisition processes, mostly 
through privatizations auctions.  
                                                 
20 To as analysis on Brazil-Portugal economical relations, see Albuquerque and Romão, 2000. To an non-aggregated analysis on 
investments and trade balances in the 1990’s, see Ramos Silva, 2001 and Ramos Silva, “Portugal /Brasil uma década de expansão das 
relações econômicas 1992-2002”. Terramar, 2002 4. Once these Iberian companies operate in services, which are low productive 
industries, their investments enable an improvement in general productive services. 
This happened because these industry are not integrated, which is the case of 
telecommunications, trade, construction, tourism, healthcare, insurance and financial 
services.  
5. The link with domestic market is central in this analysis. That is, it is important to the 
Iberian investment that the receiving economies grow and that some source of income 
distribution takes place. These investments do not depend only on some few cheaper 
resources that make an exporting strategy possible. 
6. The latter item helps to explain the Spanish diplomacy’s effort to improve its 
relations with Latin America, which became a priority to Madrid. The creation of the 
Iberian-American Cupola in 1991 is a sign of this project. It is the only discussion 
forum in which Latin American countries (including Cuba) meet without the United 
States. As an external link with high politically importance, the Iberian-American 
Cupola has also strengthened the Portuguese and Spanish diplomacy in the European 
context. 
7. Portuguese foreign direct investments started in 1995, and therefore is a latecomer if 
compared to Spanish investments. Besides representing a much smaller dimension if 
compared to the Spanish case and being restricted to Brazil, Portuguese investments 
have been articulated in some areas, such as telecommunications. 
8. In relation to the South Cone countries, one cannot assert anything about a single 
tendency and about possible developments. There are several alternatives about the 
MERCOSUR’s political and institutional densities concerning its more strategic 
objectives, which are explicit inspired in the EU. Concretely, it is an imperfect Trade 
Union, and the real integration problems (such as macroeconomic policymaking) are 
yet to be solved. In the same cense, MERCOSUR countries have not been together in 
negotiations with creditors and in decisions on adjustment policies that have been 
blocking economic growth. Another important aspect is the necessity of policies on 
technology, science and foreign trade that could be capable to articulate/internalize the 
innovative capacity originated by foreign direct investments. If these points are not 
confronted, one will be watching to a more sophisticated recreation of new 
subordination and exclusion forms. If this gap is confirmed, the potential economic 
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